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![]( "Harming Competition and Consumers Under the Guise of Protecting Privacy: An Analysis of Apple’s iOS 14 Policy Updates")
![]( "CEO Compensation and Product Market Collusion")
![]( "“Privacy Fixing” After Texas et al v. Google and CMA v. Google (Privacy Sandbox): Approaches to Antitrust Considerations of Privacy")
![]( "Harming Competition and Consumers Under the Guise of Protecting Privacy: An Analysis of Apple’s iOS 14 Policy Updates")
![]( "CEO Compensation and Product Market Collusion")
![]( "“Privacy Fixing” After Texas et al v. Google and CMA v. Google (Privacy Sandbox): Approaches to Antitrust Considerations of Privacy")
![]( "A Note on Antitrust, Labor, and “No Cold Call” Agreements in Silicon Valley")
![]( "Vertical Mergers and Input Foreclosure When Rivals Can Substitute Inputs: Safe Harbor for Low Share of Input Sales to Rivals?")
![]( "The Google Complaint: A Step Backward for Antitrust Policy")
![]( "Concentration is Not Producing Higher Profits or Markups")
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curlIP: 751394859
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curlIP: 751394859
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curlIP: 751394859
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North America Column
A Proposal to Invigorate Ex Post Merger Policy
By Menesh S. Patel1
Introduction
Consider a hypothetical merger subject to Hart-Scott-Rodino. Suppose that the merger receives a second request, but the reviewing agency ultimately determines...
Harming Competition and Consumers Under the Guise of Protecting Privacy: An...
By D. Daniel Sokol & Feng Zhu*
Apple’s iOS 14 update represents an anti-competitive strategy disguised as a privacy-protecting measure. Apple now prohibits non-Apple apps...
CEO Compensation and Product Market Collusion
By Sangeun Ha, Fangyuan Ma & Alminas Žaldokas1
Introduction
Product market collusion cases are rampant and span different industries. Recent and ongoing investigations in the U.S....
“Privacy Fixing” After Texas et al v. Google and CMA v....
By Tim Cowen, Claire Barraclough & Josh Koran1
Executive Summary
Societies have designed antitrust laws to protect consumers from unfair practices (e.g. exclusive dealing, price fixing,...
A Note on Antitrust, Labor, and “No Cold Call” Agreements in...
By Russell Pittman (US Department of Justice)1
The issue of how to provide incentives for a private firm to invest in the knowledge and capabilities...
Vertical Mergers and Input Foreclosure When Rivals Can Substitute Inputs: Safe...
By Serge Moresi & Marius Schwartz*
A vertical merger between a firm and an input supplier to that firm can generate efficiencies by eliminating double...
The Google Complaint: A Step Backward for Antitrust Policy
By Jay Ezrielev (Elevecon)1
The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and eleven states filed their Complaint against Google, accusing the company of anticompetitive conduct to...
Concentration is Not Producing Higher Profits or Markups
By Joe Kennedy (ITIF)*
Introduction
The United States is in the middle of a renewed debate on antitrust policy. Although most antitrust experts favor keeping some...
Shifting the Burden in Acquisitions of Nascent and Potential Competitors: Not...
By Jay Ezrielev (Elevecon)*
I. Introduction
There is a heated debate in antitrust today about what lawmakers, courts, and enforcers should do about mergers between potential...
Possible Problems in the Google Case
By Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb1
Google invented neither the search engine nor the Internet browser, but it made them better. Competing on...
Umbrella Liability: Has Its Time Come?
By Michael D. Hausfeld & Irving Scher (Hausfeld)1
Introduction
This Article addresses the case law and commentary dealing with the question of whether antitrust claims brought...
Could New York’s 21st Century Antitrust Act Usher a New Chapter...
By Shaoul Sussman (Institute for Local Self-Reliance)1
Over the last year, much-deserved attention has been paid to the ongoing Congressional antitrust investigation of Big Tech...
An Anticlimactic Ending in the “Roadmap for an Antitrust Case Against...
By Chris Renner (Davis Wright Tremaine)1
The “Roadmap for an Antitrust Case Against Facebook” (the “Roadmap”) purports to explain how publicly available materials, sourced primarily...
Two Sides to Every Story: Growing Tensions Between Legal Rules and...
By Andrew J. Ewalt (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer US LLP)1
In Ohio v. American Express (Amex),2 the Supreme Court introduced into U.S. antitrust law a new...
Expectations for Healthcare Mergers During the Pandemic
By Andrew Elzinga, Avigail Kifer & Arthur Corea-Smith (Cornerstone Research)1
Trends in merger investigations related to the current COVID-19-induced downturn may be too new to...
Is the Rest of the World Moving Toward the Canadian Approach...
By Lawrence P. Schwartz, Ph.D. (Former Lay Member, Canadian Competition Tribunal)1
In one of his last public speeches, former Commissioner of Competition John Pecman proclaimed...
The Political Misuse of Antitrust: Doing the Right Thing for the...
By Spencer Weber Waller & Jacob E. Morse (Loyola University)*
Introduction
The increased importance of antitrust as a campaign issue and a political conversation raises long-standing...
Break up Denny’s
By John D. Harkrider (Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider LLP)*
Over the last six decades,1 millions of hungry Americans have pulled off the side of...
Antitrust and Tech: Europe and the United States Really Do Differ,...
By Gregory J. Werden (U.S. Department of Justice, Retired)1
In Antitrust and Tech: Europe and the United States Differ, and It Matters (CPI Antitrust Chronicle,...
In Defense of Class Actions: A Response to Makan Delrahim’s Commentary...
By Michael D. Hausfeld, Irving Scher & Laurence T. Sorkin1
I. Introduction
Few would argue with the proposition that, in the antitrust context, indirect purchaser class...
